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A Hard Day’s Night? The United States and the







This paper examines the jihadist threat and its implications for the global war on
terrorism (GWOT)—a threat noted for its commitment, determination, innovation,
and lethality. The United States is struggling to configure its instruments of national
power to address a threat that has thus far proven unresponsive to these national
instruments. The paper argues that the jihadist threat needs to be framed in the
context of fundamental changes in the dynamics of the international system. These
dynamics have left the United States struggling to conceptually bound and define the
jihadist threat in the new security environment. This paper offers explanations for
this struggle and concludes that if not successful in bounding and understanding the
threat that the United States may win battles in the GWOT, but it can never win the
wider war.
“The number of serious international terrorist incidents more than tripled last
year, according to U.S. government figures, a sharp upswing in deadly attacks
that the State Department has decided not to make public in its annual report
on terrorism due to Congress this week.”
Susan B. Glasser, Washington Post, April 27, Page A01
Thomas H. Johnson and James A. Russell are on the faculty of the Department of National
Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The views expressed in this
paper are the author’s own. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference
on Countering Modern Terrorism—History, Current Issues and Future Threats, Berlin, Germany,
December 16–17, 2004. We would like to thank Edward Brinko, Harold Ingram, Alan Richards,
Robert Freedman, Ann-Marie Baylouny, William Casebeer, Milton Gianulis, and Chris Clary for
comments and suggestions concerning an earlier draft of this article.
Passages from the Koran are used within the article. We are acutely aware of the problems
associated with the utilization of passages of the Koran in an analysis such as ours. As Olivier
Roy forcefully argues in his brilliant book the Globalized Islam: The Search for the New Ummah
(New York: Columbia University, 2004, pp. 41), the use of Koranic passages in political analyses
is usually “sterile and only helps to support prejudice.” Our use of Koranic passages is NOT meant
to suggest that we believe that the present jihad is rooted in Islamic tradition or the Koran. Rather
we offer such quotes to illustrate the kinds of passages of the Koran that bin Laden and other
jihadists have used in their attempt to hijack Islam for their perverted purposes. Our use of these
passages should NOT be interpreted or inferred as a belief that the Koran or Islam is responsible
for present anti-Western jihad. Rather it should be interpreted as recognition that the jihadists will
twist Islam for their own purposes under a veil of piety.
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Introduction
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, political scientists, historians, and policy makers
around the world have struggled unsuccessfully to construct a theory that could explain
the seemingly new, chaotic global environment. The debate has raged in academic con-
ferences, think-tank events, the op-ed pages of newspapers, talk-show entertainment, and
other media. The upshot of much of this debate, however, returns to a simple and salient
point: that the chaotic environment is just that—chaotic.
Particularly troubling for the United States and other actors is that the international
environment appears unresponsive to the instruments of national power that had success-
fully preserved stability during the Cold War. The unresponsiveness of the environment
to national instruments of power raises critical questions for the United States and its
partners as they seek to prosecute something called the “global war on terrorism.” It
seems clear that the United States must address the sources of this disconnect if it is to
meet the challenges facing it in the international environment.
This disconnect is creating a palpable sense of unease in policy and academic elites
due to the apparent inability of the United States to translate its position of global
dominance into instruments that can effectively manage various troubling parts of the
international system. After all, why can’t the United States and its 1.2 million person
military (supported by a budget that could top $500 billion in 2005) control the 7-miles
road from the Baghdad airport into the city? And why don’t the tribal leaders along
the impoverished North West frontier of Pakistan and Afghanistan (that has historically
witnessed kidnappings and ransoms as a regular social dynamic) avail themselves of the
$25 million reward (recently increased to $50 million) for Osama bin Laden (rumored to
be frequenting these climes)? Why don’t the recruits for emerging new networked terror
cells around the world recognize the hopelessness of their apparent objective to recreate
an Islamic caliphate?
We posit an answer, or a bridge, that can help the United States and its global partners
address these troubling issues. A central argument of this paper is that the international
system is being driven by what systems theorists would call “subsystem dynamics,” or
forces not explicitly associated with or controlled by nation states.1 Accepting the growing
importance of these forces has profound implications for United States’ security strategy
and policy in the years ahead as it seeks to prosecute an open-ended war against terrorism
around the world. Accepting the growing importance of these subsystem dynamics will
require nothing short of an intellectual revolution, since the United States today remains
rooted in a paradigm built on the assumption of its global dominance. We believe that
this paradigm is disconnected from the international environment.
During the 1990s (and some would argue as early as the 1960s), evidence of the
growing salience of subsystem forces emerged as it became steadily more difficult for
the remaining hegemon, i.e., the United States, to manage the international environment.
Actors engaged in ethnic genocide and other heinous acts that shocked the “civilized”
world. When confronted by the United States, instead of submitting to the hegemon’s
military might, the actors adopted asymmetric tactics as part of a cognitive paradigm that
showed little “respect” for the hegemon’s statistical superiority or its formidable military
capabilities.
Starting in the 1990s, political scientists and historians posited a number of expla-
nations that essentially described the obvious trends in subsystem dynamics. Various
arguments emerged that attempted to dissect and understand these dynamics. Samuel
Huntington, for example, defined civilizations or cultures as the dominating feature of
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the international system2 and the principal cause of friction within the global environment.
A variety of scholars identified resource scarcity and environmental factors as prominent
causes of subsystem friction.3 During the 1990s, the world looked on in horror at the
genocide in Rwanda and the brutal ethnic sectarian conflict in the Balkans. Reacting to
these events, a school of international relations theory known as “neo-realism” gathered
steam. The neo-realists took a dark view of the world—believing that the international
system was devolving into the Hobbesian state of nature, where the strong survive and
the weak are subjugated.4 The neo-realists argued that the United States should adopt a
more muscular and aggressive approaches to impose order—a view that has profoundly
shaped the Bush Administration’s approach to national security strategy.
The 1990s also saw a technological revolution created by the internet and personal
computers supporting the phenomenon of globalization, which became an increasingly
powerful force shaping the international system. The increased pace of interaction be-
tween states, non-state actors, and individuals around the globe layered yet another level
of theoretical complexity over these theoretical arguments.5 Globalization has played a
role in the declining importance of physical boundaries between states. But while phys-
ical distance separating actors is also becoming less important, global interconnectivity
is creating new, three-dimensional spaces and networks that have introduced a new level
of complexity to the international system. These new spaces are being used by non-state
actors for a variety of purposes, some of which are benign and some nefarious, such as
the considerable websites used by terrorist originations to recruit and communicate.
Globalization’s interconnectivity has created its own systemic dynamic that does not
easily fit within existing theoretical models of the international system. Global networks
promise to continue growing as the movement of data, money, and people throughout the
international system accelerate in the years ahead. But while globalization governed by
normative rule sets has made physical boundaries less important in a virtual sense, states
remain defined by these physical boundaries and they still exist in identifiable geographic
areas. The virtual state is not yet a reality.
Despite these profound changes to the international system, it seems clear that pro-
tection and oversight over these geographic spaces remain pre-eminent imperatives for
states. States inhabit physical spaces and remain charged with protection of these spaces
from internal and external threats. States have addressed defense of their geographic
spaces in a variety of different ways, depending on threat perception, the means available
for protection, and their evaluation of the overall security environment. After spearhead-
ing the global defense system that outlasted the Soviet Union, the major industrialized
states are in the process of restructuring their defense policies to further their interests
and offer protection and security to their citizens. This is particularly the case in the
United States, which, in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, has proclaimed a
dramatically redefined global security environment and is taking equally dramatic steps
to try and realign its internal organizational structures to better address emerging threats.
While it is true that the reorientation of United States defense policy can be tied to the
September 11th attacks, it can also be argued that these changes were in fact long overdue,
reflecting a changed international system where new and emerging subsystem dynamics
have emerged to drive the overall nature of the broader international framework. What
the September 11th attacks simply showed was how wide the delta had become between
the threat environment and governmental institutions that were designed to protect the
nation. These dominant institutions remained rooted in behavioral and organizational
dynamics that reflected the Cold War intellectual paradigm, which had morphed into a
sister concept of the United States as global hegemon.
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Throughout the 1990s, U.S. thinking on defense policy, planning and budgeting
remained essentially rooted in its historic Cold War experience, but the nature of conflict
and the tools of warfare were evolving for state and non-state actors. It is now suddenly
a cliché to assert, for example, that campaign-style conventional force-on-force wars are
being replaced in the lexicon of the United States security community by a new scheme
of conventional conflict called “effects based operations,” or “shock and awe” by the
press. This scheme of warfare offers the prospect of using force at reduced physical and
monetary costs, lower collateral damage, and an integrated targeting scheme designed to
undermine the opponent’s will to fight.
Non-state actors have also moved on, with various terrorist organizations embracing
a global organizational structure, innovative marketing and fundraising techniques, and
new technologies designed to enhance the lethality of their operations and increase the
efficiency of their operational structures. Some terrorist organizations now appear inter-
ested in acquiring capabilities to cause mass casualties and disruptions to strategic effect.
At least as practiced by al Qaeda, tactical and localized attacks intended to exert leverage
in pursuit of a narrowly defined political objectives seem to have been overtaken by what
many describe as a global insurgency.6
The changing nature of conflict and the changing nature of actors populating the in-
ternational environment all bespeak a changed global security environment. While armed
great power conflict is thankfully absent from the international system, chronic instability
in the form of ethnocentric and sectarian conflict seems as pervasive as ever. Proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, the continued existence of states operating outside global
behavioral norms (the so-called “rogues”), and emergent globally networked terrorist or-
ganizations receive particular emphasis in a wide variety of the Bush administration’s
strategy documents.
It must be admitted that the United States is still struggling to conceptually bound and
define the security environment. While some applaud the Bush administration’s moral
clarity in drawing distinctions between good and evil, critics assert that the so-called
global war on terrorism, or GWOT, remains a conceptual morass that has intuitive appeal
for domestic political purposes but which is practically useless as a basis on which to
develop strategic guidance that can be used to build plans, policies and programs.7
However, arguments about the applicability of specific policies, plans, and proce-
dures miss a broader point: that the United States remains conceptually and institution-
ally mired in a paradigm based on the idea that the United States is now the unrivaled
global hegemon. The shift to what political scientists would describe as “unipolarity” is
reflected by continual references in policy and academic circles asserting the salience of
U.S. statistical superiority relative to other states with the accompanying assertions that
this statistical dominance affords the United States unparalleled global power and influ-
ence. Data to support this view is readily at hand. The U.S. $11 trillion gross domestic
product accounts for nearly 1/3 of the world’s total; U.S. defense spending represents
half of global totals and far outdistances the combined total spending of any combi-
nation of its potential rivals. The United States since September 11 has experienced
the most rapid surge in military spending since the Korean War. No other country in
the world can afford a single fighter aircraft that will cost between $250–$325 million
each.8
Given these irrefutable indicators, it is perhaps not surprising that the instruments
of power, organizational, and behavioral structures remain rooted in assumptions that the
international framework continues to be defined by its dominant actor, i.e., the United
States. This is simply an extension of Cold War logic. But this logic is now disconnected
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from an international environment defined not by U.S. hegemony but by the growing
influence of subsystem dynamics. Intellectually, it means the United States is left trying
to fit a two dimensional square peg into a three-dimensional undefined space. Hence the
United States metaphorically faces the lyrically incongruent Lennon/McCartney’s “Hard
Day’s Night.”
The troubling implications to these and other subsystem issues suggest that the United
States faces a number of profound intellectual and strategic challenges if it is to effectively
exercise power and influence the reconfigured global environment: (1) Acknowledgement
of the importance of subsystem dynamics as a defining challenge of the evolving inter-
national environment; (2) Assessing the threats to U.S. interests based on a corresponding
series of assumptions that accept the dominance of subsystem dynamics; (3) Restructuring
the nation’s institutions to protect and further its interests in such an environment; and
(4) Having the political and societal will to execute policies, plans and resources that
reflect these realities.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the threats the United States faces in the
so-called Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT. In assessing the nature of these threats,
this paper will examine a series of implications and characteristics that the threats pose
for U.S. policies and counterterrorism strategies and tactics. In defining the nature and
characteristics of these threats, this paper will attempt to provide a terrorist perspective
on the relevant religious, cultural, political, and military domains of the GWOT.9 Consid-
eration of this perspective can offer a radically different paradigm for suggesting policy
prescriptions and implications when compared to those commonly used in policy circles
that remain driven by uni- and bipolar assumptions and prescriptions.
Understanding the threats from the perspective of the “terrorist” is challenging and
troubling. As will be evident below, such a perspective challenges modal assumptions
concerning American prestige, power, and influence as well as the underlying structure
of the international system. Indeed, the connotations of many of terrorist perspectives
seem to imply that while the United States may very well win each military campaign
associated with the GWOT this does not equate with winning a broader war being driven
by powerful subsystem dynamics.
A New American Strategic Imperative—Counterterrorism
The United States has embraced the idea that there is a new and overriding threat to its
interests. Following the September 11th attacks, the Bush Administration released a series
of strategy documents all of which indicate that the “global war on terrorism” is now the
principal security problem facing the United States, replacing the Cold War as a unifying
theme for national security strategy. As noted by President Bush in the introduction of
National Security Strategy report: “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great
industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now shadowy networks of individuals can
bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single
tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern
technology against us.”10
The National Strategy to Combat Terrorism identifies a variety of critical national
goals and objectives in the context of the struggle against terrorism: (1) Identify and
locate terrorists, terrorist organizations and their command, and control and support in-
frastructure; (2) Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists and ending state
sponsorship of terrorism; (3) Establish and maintain an international standard of account-
ability; (4) Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism; (5) Interdict
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and disrupt material support; (6) Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens; (7) Diminish
the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.11
If terrorism represents the principal threat facing the United States, that makes the
mission of counterterrorism a pre-eminent organizing principle to build relevant capa-
bilities for those government agencies that have a role in the fight. The United States’
counterterrorism policy consists of four basic positions: (1) Make no concessions to ter-
rorists and strike no deals; (2) Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes; (3) Isolate and
apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior;
(4) Bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S.
and require assistance.12
Implementation of counterterrorism policy falls across the variety of different gov-
ernmental agencies. But it seems clear that the U.S. military and the Department of
Defense will assume prominent roles in execution of the GWOT. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, unequivocally states that the war on terrorism
is the military’s top priority in the introduction to the National Military Strategy:
First while protecting the United States we must win the War on Terrorism. The
attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that our liberties are vulnerable.
The prospect of future attacks, potentially employing weapons of mass de-
struction, makes it imperative that we act now to stop the terrorists before
they can attack again. We must continue to root out transnational terrorist
networks, sever their connections with state sponsors, eliminate their bases
of operations, counter dangerous proliferation and establish a global anti-
terrorism environment.”13
While the Bush administration’s strategy documents also universally note that the
fight against terrorism will require an integrated government-wide approach using law
enforcement, diplomacy, international organizations, strategic communications, and other
capabilities, it is fair to say that much of the responsibility for prosecuting a sustained
global campaign against terrorists will fall to the United States military—dubbed by one
commentator as the new “sheriff” in the international system.14
A variety of factors will drive the military’s pre-eminent counterterrorism role. The
first overriding imperative is that the United States is not conducting a defensive battle that
relies on containment and deterrence. All of the Bush administration’s strategy documents
clearly indicate the desire to preemptively take the fight to the enemy wherever it is and
attack terrorist groups before they can threaten the American homeland. That means
fighting forward.
The military’s forward deployed global posture developed during the Cold War will
figure prominently in a variety of counter-terrorist missions. The Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) and the National Military Strategy highlight the critical and increasingly
important role that these forces will play. The QDR notes that: “Over time, [forward de-
ployed] U.S. forces will be tailored increasingly to maintain favorable regional balances
in concert with U.S. Allies and friends with the aim of swiftly defeating attacks with only
modes reinforcement and, where necessary, assuring access for follow-on forces.”15 Echo-
ing this theme, the National Military Strategy notes: “Combatant commanders, employing
a mix of forward-stationed rotational and temporarily deployed capabilities tailored to
perform specific missions, improve our ability to act within and across borders, strengthen
the role of partners and expand joint and multinational capabilities. Posture and pres-
ence enhancements also serve to assure our friends, improve the ability to prosecute
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the WOT [war on terrorism]; deter, dissuade, and defeat other threats; and support
transformation.”16 The Defense Department is in the process of realigning its global
military posture to better address threats in the so-called “arc of crisis” that are widely
seen as part of GWOT. As part of the plan, the United States has developed operat-
ing areas in the Central Asian Republics and Pakistan, which complement the existing
infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.
A second powerful reason driving the U.S. military’s counter-terrorism role is means.
The Bush administration’s fiscal year 2005 defense budget that will exceed $500 billion
(including anticipated requirements for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) now repre-
sents about half of all global defense spending, providing the United States military with
resources available to no other country and no other part of the federal government. The
U.S. military remains one of the only organizations in the world capable of conduct-
ing sustained operations simultaneously in far-flung parts the globe on the scale that is
required. The U.S. military can do global logistics like nobody else.
A third reason driving the U.S. military counterterrorism role is domestic politics.
The United States public is being told by its political leadership that the nation is “at
war.” By drawing upon a “war” metaphor, the nation’s political leadership creates an
understandable perception and expectation that the military is engaged in operations to
defeat the adversary and defend the homeland. Such an approach seemed clear the day
after the September 11th attacks when the Navy was ordered out to sea to patrol the
nation’s coastlines—although the presence of these ships on the day of the attacks could
not have foiled Mohammed Atta and his fellow conspirators. The domestic political
pressure to keep the military continuously engaged shows no sign of letting up. And, it
has to be noted that the public wants to know that the billions of dollars lavished on
their nation’s military are being used to forestall adversaries and protect the homeland—
a mission that U.S. military institutions are embracing with reluctance.
A fourth reason is history. The historical experience and expertise gained during the
Cold War in conducting coalition warfare is relevant for combating terrorist groups around
the world. The conflict will require a sustained long-term, even open-ended commitment,
that will require coalition partners providing access to military facilities and joint opera-
tions that will build interoperability on an ongoing basis. The United States constructed
these partnerships all over the world during the Cold War—partnerships that will have
to be resurrected and maintained over long periods just as they were in the post World
War II period. In parallel, the United States will have to re-energize its programs to build
host-nation military capabilities through foreign military sales and training—programs
that will need to be coordinated through training missions manned with military officers
and trained civilians. Building these military-to-military relationships will also involve
exchanges in professional military education as well as joint exercises and training, which
will again replicate activities developed during the Cold War.
The collective documentation and reorientation of the country’s security establish-
ment as highlighted in the Bush administration’s various strategy documents is impressive.
But despite the rhetorical embrace of battling new and shadowy enemies, it remains un-
clear that the cold war security paradigm has in fact been banished to the dustbin of
history. The same strategy documents that proclaim the dawn of a new era in the global
security environment also proclaim unbridled confidence that the United States maintains
its ability to shape and manage and ultimately control the dynamics of the international
environment. The documents essentially assert a belief in U.S. hegemonic power.
Interestingly, in 1991 President George H. Bush flirted with the idea of embracing
fundamental and structural change in the international environment. Months after the
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conclusion of the first Gulf War on September 11, 1991 in his “New World Order”
Speech, Bush suggested that:
Out of these troubled times . . . a new world order can emerge: a new era—
freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more
secure in the quest for peace. . . . Today that new world is struggling to be
born. A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where
the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where
the strong respects the rights of the weak.17
In this speech, President Bush expressed intuitive recognition that the era of dom-
inate system actors was drawing to a close—a dramatic departure from the model that
drove the U.S. national security establishment for the previous 60 years. Bush’s speech
recognized and accepted that global subsystems would become the main driver in in-
ternational dynamics. But this speech was soon forgotten amidst an election campaign
fought on domestic issues. The inability of the United States to embrace his ideas has
created an overriding sense of confusion and cognitive dissonance that continues to this
day. Describing the nation’s Cold War adversary seemed relatively straightforward and
became intellectually comfortable as this description became part of an overall cognitive
belief structure. Today the international environment is characterized not by cognitive
consistency but by cognitive dissonance.
President Bush’s speech proved prescient. During the 1990s, the ascendancy of sub-
system dynamics became apparent. In Somalia, the United States confronted a discom-
bobulated landscape and a foe that appeared manifestly unimpressed by U.S. military
capabilities. Aideed’s militias showed no regard for the human cost of confronting the
United States, bloodied the U.S. military’s nose using asymmetric tactics and convinced
President Clinton that further intervention was pointless. With the searing experience of
Somalia still figuring prominently, the United States stood on the sidelines in Rwanda
and again watched in disbelief as one tribal actor turned on another in a brutal genocide.
In the Balkans, the United States once again confronted a subsystem dynamic that defied
the Cold War rule sets, though it did eventually lead an international coalition to stop
the conflict by deploying forces to separate the warring parties. The rest of the decade
saw the U.S. military engaged around the world in what became derisively known (in
the military) as Military Operations Other than War, or MOOTW. During the election
campaign in 2001, candidate George W. Bush indicated his commitment to put an end
to these messy and open-ended operations that were chewing up manpower, money and
equipment.
The September 11 attacks of course changed this approach. In his address to a joint
session of Congress nine days after September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush
suggested that the world envisioned by his father 10 years earlier had been turned upside
down and he darkly warned states harboring terrorists to:
Deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide
in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you
have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid work-
ers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist train-
ing camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in
their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full
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access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer
operating. . . . Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.18
Bush’s stark words provided a harbinger of the initial conceptual outlines of what
would become known as GWOT—the central priority of U.S. national security policy.
Two weeks after delivering this speech, the U.S. attacked the Taliban and al Qaeda—
initially named Operation Infinite Justice. Protests from Muslim countries lead to the
changing of the mission’s name to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on September 25,
2001.
The initial overwhelming international support for OEF and the United Nations’ en-
dorsement of a renewed global effort against terrorists seemed to signal a new global
coalition lead by the United States to reimpose order in the international system. Today,
however, the United States finds itself in a position of international isolation and even
disrepute. It seems inconceivable to many that United States’ policies based on Presi-
dent Bush’s formulation that “Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity;
the birthright of every person—in every civilization”19 are not being embraced around
the world. Instead the United States is confronted by powerful subsystem dynamics
manifesting as an ideology that casts what seem like noble, moral and universal truths as
secondary to imperial ambition, cultural and religious subjugation and support for tyrants
and dictators.
In short, the United States remains intellectually suspended between competing uni-
verses that are defined by fundamentally opposed views of the nature of the global system.
The United States believes in itself as the hegemon, while much of the rest of the world
marches to the beat of the global subsystem drummer. The intellectual bridge between
these competing universes lies for the United States in returning to Sun Tzu’s age-old
strategic axiom of “know thy enemy.”
Understanding the Threat
“Jihad is as essential to Islamic identity and self-definition as the Mass is to
Catholicism.” —Historian Malise Ruthven20
“The focus of the U.S. is against the concept of jihad. Jihad in Islam is one
of the greatest actions to repulse tyranny and to restore justice and rights.”
—Dr. Mohammed Abd al-Hali, Cairo’s al-Azhar University21
“[Global trends] are working against the notion that a nation strongly armed
is adequately shielded against all threats to it and its interests. . . . Even today,
knowledge of one’s enemy and his culture and society may be more important
than knowledge of his order of battle”.
—Retired Vice ADM Arthur Cebrowski22
The United States has only recently begun to recognize the nature of the threat it is
facing in GWOT. As argued in the 9-11 Commission Report, prior to the September 11th
attack the U.S. did not understand its enemy and did not give significant weight to the
terrorist threat.23 While significant improvement has been realized in threat recognition
since the 9-11 Report was published, the Bush Administration still appears confused about
the nature and implications of the jihad or Muslim insurgency. The most realistic and
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best official description of the phenomenon appears in the recent draft Joint Operational
Concept for Defeating Terrorist Organizations (JOC-DTO) November 14, 2004.24 This
is a planning document being drafted by the Special Operations Command in Tampa,
Florida. Once finalized, the document will form the basis for the development of joint
capabilities throughout the Defense Department to defeat terrorist organizations. These
capabilities will, in turn, form the basis for programs and budgets. The JOCs being de-
veloped throughout the nation’s military institutions are part of the Defense Department’s
implementation of capabilities-based planning.
There is little argument that the United States is facing a jihad that is perceived by
its proponents as a holy and just war to defend the Muslim faith. This jihad is a world-
wide, primarily Arab,25 insurgency that is not based on merely terrorist acts or acts of
criminality. Nor is this jihad based on or represented by oft repeated Bush Administration
rhetoric that the “terrorist evildoers” act because of their hate for democracy or American
freedoms. Such beliefs represent not only impoverished and inaccurate views of the threat
but also trivialize the threat implications and obscure appropriate policy prescriptions and
actions.26
A more nuanced view is being developed by the Special Operations Command, or
SOCOM. The JOC-DTO states, “Despite the use of modern technologies by all parties,
the fundamental nature of this war is an insurgency—a struggle for popular perceptions
of political legitimacy and control over Islamic civilization that extends beyond national
borders.”27 SOCOM’s realization of the nature of the threat provides a healthy and
welcome departure from simplistic sound-bytes delivered in press conferences and talk
shows by senior administration officials.
The true believers fight for the cause of Allah, but
the infidels fight for the devil. Fight then against





Never think that those who were
slain in the cause of Allah are
dead. They are alive and well
provided for by their Lord. . . .
Koran 3:169
Intellectual precision as to
the nature of the threat and
difficulties facing the United
States in mitigating the threat
is critical. Taking a cue from the
adversary could be instructive.
For example, bin Laden has been
extremely precise when he states that he is waging a holy war
against the United States.28 This war is not necessarily directed
at American freedoms, liberty,29 or democracy.30 However, from
the perspective of many Muslim theocrats, democracies and
socialist governments undermine Islam in traditionally Muslim
countries/areas.31 The goal of these adherents
is to see Allah’s religion reign supreme over the
entire world. That means the establishment of
Muslim theocracies. In order to do such
democracies, socialist and any other form of
government must eventually be destroyed. Key to
understanding the jihadists’ beliefs is their view
that polices of the United States and its apostate
Muslim friends32 are directly aimed at harming and undermining “true” Islam and its
faithful.33 Muslim extremists primarily hate and attack the United States because of their
perception of U.S. actions not American values.34
Bin Laden and other jihadists sincerely believe that the West and primarily the
United States represents a mortal danger to Islam. In the jihadist’s eyes U.S. policy
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and actions irrefutably confirm this belief. The United States supports and mandates the
Zionists to continue their occupation of Palestine;35 U.S. troops remain in Saudi Arabia,
the land of the two holy shrines; the United States supports apostate tyrants;36 the United
States “occupies” Afghanistan and Iraq and threatens Syria and Iran; the United States is
establishing bases in the Middle East, the Gulf, and South and Central Asia; the United
States steals Muslim natural resources, most prominently oil, and; quite simply American
and Western corruption threatens Muslim souls. In the eyes of jihadists, the United States
has become the restorer of European 19th and 20th Century colonialism and jihad is the
only antidote to the United States and its explicitly hostile policies towards Islam. Bin
Laden and other jihadist insurgents “mean exactly what they say: to them America is the
font of all evil, the ‘head of the snake,’ and it must be converted or destroyed.”37
What makes the jihadists’ convictions so threatening and problematic are that they are
based on the belief that they are fighting a defensive jihad against the United States and its
allies.38 Moreover, this defensive jihad is revealed by Allah in the Koran and the Sunnah39
and thus not subject to interpretation. Islam has been attacked and it is the personal duty
and responsibility of every Muslim to fight back to the death if necessary. A lack of a
response to this attack by an individual Muslim in the eyes of bin Laden and other jihadist
insurgents is tantamount to sin and eternal damnation. These are powerful motivating
forces and cannot be taken lightly by policy responses, strategies or organizations.
The JOC-DTO analyses the nature of the threat in a fashion similar to that presented
above, but while it argues that the GWOT is really a war against a global insurgency, the
JOC-DTO states that the individual jihadist does not view him or herself as an insurgent.
The DoD defines an insurgent as a “member of a political party who rebels against
established leadership.”40 The JOC-DTO argues that individual jihadists
“[d]o not see themselves as terrorists or even as political insurgents, but rather
as holy warriors engaged in a heroic and epic struggle inspired by an all-
encompassing religious mythos. [The jihadists] are motivated by a different
morality than we are accustomed to in the Western world. They interpret
Islamic law literally and without regard for its historical context. They do
not recognize international (Western) laws of war or any Western notions of
morality that contradict Islamic law. [They] believe that:
[1] Uniquely Islamic rhythms of history compel them to pursue violent
change to restore Islam after generations of corruption.
[2] Islam is under attack by the West and that it is their holy obligation to
defend their faith against this attack.
[3] Their cause is just and right-minded and that their victory is preordained
and inevitable.
[4] The act of struggle itself is a triumph that unites them with God; they
cannot be defeated, as the West defines the term, so long as they continue
the perpetual struggle.
[They] do not recognize the Western concept of statehood or the Western
concept of state monopolies on the legitimate use of political violence. [They]
do not recognize any distinction between religion and politics. [And they] do
not apply Islamic prohibitions against unlimited warfare to those Muslims or
non-Muslims who live their lives outside our enemies’ literal and intolerant
interpretation of Islamic law.41
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Believers, when you encounter
infidels on the march, do not turn
your backs to them in flight. If anyone
on that day turns his back to them,
except for tactical reasons, or to join
another band, he shall incur the
wrath of Allah and Hell shall be his
home; an evil fate.
Koran 8:15
American Islamic scholar Professor
Bernard Lewis has argued that “Islam is
not only a matter of faith and practice,
it is also an identity and a loyalty—for
many an identity that transcends all
others.”42 The United States faces a
jihadist mentality that transcends the
individual and which reflects the jihadist’s
views of the tenets of his core faith and
personage. The unalterable law of Allah
is the source of response.
Make war on them until idolatry shall cease and
Allah’s religion shall reign supreme.
Koran 8:39
What more powerful motivating temporal or spatial force could the United States
face? And militarily conquering a state or occupying a nation’s capital cannot defeat
this force. For this is truly a
transnational jihadist movement.
It is not contained within any
border or borders. This jihadist
mentality some argue reflects the
style of pre-Islamic warfare on
the Arabian Peninsula and results in a perpetual condition of warfare and not a finite
undertaking of a war. This conception flies in the face of western linear conceptions of
conflict and war.
Whether unarmed or well equipped,
march on and fight for the cause
of Allah. . . .
Koran 9:41
The Bush administration’s statements
that terrorists are motivated primarily by
their hate of our freedoms and democracy
are matched to a public diplomacy and
information campaigns directed at
“educating” the Muslim masses of the true
nature of the United States.43 This public
diplomacy campaign is probably destined for failure, since it fails to reflect an appreci-
ation for the subsystem dynamics that are defined by the jihadist’s hate that, from the
U.S. perspective, can only be met by direct and violent military actions.
The jihadists initial aim is deterring the United States militarily (including WMD)
from attacking things they love—their faith, brethren, and land. There is little convincing
evidence to suggest that they view violence and conflict as an end in itself.
Do Muslim theocrats want peace? Absolutely. But peace is not defined as the absence
of armed conflict. Violence and conflict are one side of the jihad. Converting and estab-
lishing theocracies is another side of the jihad. There can be no peace for the Muslim
theocrat while wicked sinners, idolatrous religions and secular governments exist. Peace
is the resultant that occurs after the enemies of Allah have be killed or converted and
Allah’s religion reigns supreme. From the Muslim theocrat’s perspective only then will
there be peace. This is the nature of the threat that the U.S. faces.
Reactions to the Threat
On October 16, 2003 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld raised a series of critical
questions concerning the United States and the GWOT to the Defense Department’s
senior staff.44 Rumsfeld’s memo expressed concern about the ability of the U.S. to
execute and win the GWOT. The well-formulated and profound questions in fact reflect
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a deeper intellectual confusion over the nature of the threat and its implications for
strategy, policy and organizational structure. Rumsfeld, for example, asked:
• Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror?
• Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environ-
ment?
• Can a big institution (such as DoD) change fast enough?
• Is the United States government changing fast enough?45
Implicitly recognizing the immense implications of GWOT on the U.S. military
and defense strategy, Rumsfeld comments that, “DoD has been organized, trained and
equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD
fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to
try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere—one that seamlessly
focuses the capabilities of several departments and agencies on this key problem.”46
Months earlier Rumsfeld raised similar issues when he wrote in the Transformation
Planning Guidance that “[t]he war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries
out for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action.” Rumsfeld
defined transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of the military’s
competition, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages
and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities.”47
The implications of Rumsfeld’s queries remain important. The assumptions underly-
ing his questions are central to the argument of this paper: that the United States remains
intellectually and organizationally rooted in an outmoded view of the international sys-
tem. Rumsfeld’s disquiet, it could be argued, flows from an intuitive recognition that the
structure of the international system has moved on, creating the mismatch between that
system and U.S. institutions designed to manage that system.
A Military Conundrum: Missions and Requirements
Despite the relevance of certain aspects of the Cold War experience, the U.S. military
faces a much more complicated and even contradictory set of mission requirements as
part of GWOT. These basic missions can be summarized as follows:
• Deny sanctuary to terrorist groups afforded by state sponsors and geographic areas
outside the control of central governments. This latter category entails operations
in some of the most remote and lawless areas of the world, such as the tri-border
region in South America, the Horn of Africa, the Central Asian Republics, and
the tribal border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also means maintaining a
series of active and ongoing military activities in support of a political coercive
and compellant framework designed to prevent states from supporting terrorist
groups.
• Identify, track and destroy terrorist groups before those groups can mount attacks
on the U.S. homeland. This mission will be accomplished by forward-deployed
surveillance assets, allowing quick targeting and destruction of identified targets—
preferably at standoff ranges using the new family of precision guided munitions,
and, if necessary, force-on-force engagements using special operations forces or
forward deployed conventional forces.
• Work with coalition partners in forward operating areas to defeat terrorist groups,
with particular emphasis on those countries being threatened by insurgents.
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• Engage in psychological and information operations that will discredit jihadist
ideologies that are at the core of the insurgent ideology.
• Help create conditions in which terrorist groups lose their legitimacy and base of
support within the broader population. This returns the military to its MOOTW
functions, involving the military in law enforcement, road building and other so-
called “stability” operations.
• Retain the flexibility to engage in a variety of forms of warfare, ranging from
conventional military operations to “irregular” or counterinsurgency operations.
• Collect intelligence that includes all the targets in forward operating areas.
These mission sets create a series of problems for the U.S. military. The fundamen-
tal contradictions in any counterinsurgency strategy are clearly evident in the military
requirements. The military is being directed to conduct information operations to dele-
gitimize the adversary while it must simultaneously destroy the adversary using tactics
and techniques that undermine the ability to conduct the information side of the campaign.
This phenomenon is on vivid display in Iraq right now. The fundamental counterinsur-
gency conundrum is also exacerbated by the widespread view that battling the al-Qaeda
ideology is considered not primarily a military problem.
Despite efforts to elevate the role of special operations forces, the U.S. military re-
mains largely organized, equipped and trained to fight a large-scale conventional war. The
GWOT requirement to exert control over remote geographic spaces necessitates conduct-
ing widespread stability operations inside these divergent locations in order to mitigate the
conditions where terrorist grow and flourish. These operations cannot be accomplished
on the scale necessary with the current organizational structure. The U.S. military re-
sembles a vat with its tap located at the top; each time the vat is tapped for those forces
that are needed the most in MOOTW missions—military police, civic affairs specialists
and training experts. The bulk of the “combat” force remains underutilized, while those
elements at the top of the vat and needed for the GWOT are overburdened, under funded
and ill equipped for the mission. Despite Secretary Rumsfeld’s efforts to “transform” the
military, the organizational structures remain grounded in a platform-centric approach to
conflict and warfare. Platforms continue to drive planning, programming and budgeting
within the $500+ billion Defense Department budget.
The United States military remains ill prepared to conduct operations in culturally
opaque regions in the world. Fifty years of Soviet-centric study and education have left an
education and training structure that must be geared up to provide language and cultural
awareness on a wide-scale for intelligence analysts, officers and enlisted personnel. In
Iraq, for example, commanders still face shortages of translators and personnel grounded
in the region’s history and culture. Correcting these steps on an institutional level will
take no less than a paradigm shift for the U.S. military, which currently de-emphasizes
regional and cultural expertise. In most U.S. military organizations, seeking this expertise
is a career-limiting move for personnel. The Navy, for example, has no dedicated career
track for foreign area officers despite the fact that it has been continuously deployed
around the world for much of the last century.
GWOT requirements entail nearly continuous operations conducted on a global scale,
straining the readiness of forces that are equipped for campaign-style linear operations
that have a beginning and an end. This is particularly the case in the Navy, which has
historically been driven by a maintenance cycle founded upon the idea that aircraft carriers
could remain at sea for 6 months, followed by an 18-months of in-port maintenance.
The Navy is now moving towards something called global CONOPS, or global concept
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of operations, in which this historic cycle has been broken. It is unclear whether and
how long the Navy can function in an environment requiring continuous operations and
maintenance-intensive high readiness levels and correspondingly difficult manning and
personnel issues. The Army, Marine Corps and Air Force all face similar challenges.
Implications of the Threat
There is little doubt that the GWOT involves a threat domain radically different to those
traditionally faced by U.S. military that at its root is based on new subsystem dynamics
within the international system. Secretary Rumsfeld implies in the aforementioned memo,
as well as in his “transformation planning guidance,” the threats and associated dynamics
of the GWOT require new institutional, doctrinal, and structural changes within DoD.48
The purpose of the next section of this paper is to assess the implications these threats
represent to U.S. counterterrorism policy and policy instruments.
Relevant Beliefs and Perception are Zero-Sum Games
The United States was originally founded by refugees of religious persecution. The
basic belief that society and polity is best served by a separation between church and
state has become an engrained staple of American political and social belief. Islam, the
source of the jihadists, however, has a radically different view. For the average Muslim,
and profoundly for the jihadist, religion is the source of all moral support, the basis for
regulating conflict and the foundation for all society, governmental organization, law, and
ultimately the justification for war. Indeed, for the Muslims the separation of religion and
government is apostasy for the simple and seemingly profound reason that only Allah
makes laws not man. Bin Laden clearly suggested the differences in the two belief systems
when he wrote in his “2002 Letter to Americans” that “[Americans] rather than ruling
by the law of Allah, chose to implement your own inferior rules and regulations, thus
following your own vain whims and desires. You run a society contrary to the nature of
mankind by separating religion from your politics.”49
Al-Qaeda’s Training Manual addresses its belief on the congruency of the entirety
of religious and political life when it states:
“Allah realized that Islam is not just performing rituals but a complete system:
Religion and government, worship and Jihad [holy war], ethics and dealing
with people, and the Koran and sword. The bitter situation that the nation has
reached is a result of its divergence from Allah’s course and his righteous law
for all places and times. That Allah realized that Islam is not just performing
rituals but [bitter situation] came about as a result of its children’s love for the
world, their loathing of death, and their abandonment of Jihad [holy war].”50
In the context of such conflicting belief systems, perceptions concerning all aspects
of social and political life become absolutely critical. Consider, for example, the case of
Islamic educational centers or madrassas. While the United States advocates the reason-
able reform of madrassas’ curriculum that it believes ferments hatred of modernity and
the West, such policy prescriptions are viewed by many Muslims as American demands
for Muslim’s to abandon Allah’s law for man-made law. When the United States asks
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and other Muslim regimes to limit, track, and control Muslim
tithing and religious charity that assist the poor, refugees, or embattled brethren, jihadists,
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as well as moderate Muslims, perceive such a policy as inhibiting zakat—one of the five
pillars of Islam.51 When the United States understandably incarcerates and declares ji-
hadists as criminals, bin Laden argues that the American state challenges Allah’s word
and holy disciples and martyrs. “Islam does not coincide or make a truce with unbelief;
but rather confronts it.”52
In social science parlance, these contradictory positions are truly zero-sum games;
there is no room for rational diplomacy with the jihadists only nonnegotiable demands
and positions.53 The United States still has difficulty recognizing this fact. It gives us
no solace to posit that the primary way to win (and we are not even sure what “win”
means in this context) the GWOT war (at least against the jihadists) is through violent
and aggressive military means.
It is important to recognize that bin Laden’s and other jihadists’ political positions
are based on their understanding and beliefs concerning Islam. Even trying to separate
politics from religion in the jihadist’s eyes is a grave misnomer and, as well, a blasphemy.
Yet the U.S. also represents an opportunity to the jihadist. It presents bin Laden and
other jihadists with a common enemy and hence, can represent a basis of unity for radical
Islamists. The U.S. and the West, in general, as an enemy allow the jihadists to harness
local commitment to their global struggle and from the jihadists perspective, promote the
continual unification of Muslim Umma (community). Fighting the jihad not only benefits
the individual because of the religious obligation associated with it;54 it also benefits the
larger Muslim community through united pious action against its enemies.
How does the United States deal in such a zero-sum world? It appears unlikely that
the jihadists will modify their behavior; for they remain unaffected by the West’s percep-
tions of their actions, hoping this indifference instills a widespread sense of vulnerability
in the public. The United States, however, must continually assess actions and policies as
to how they will be perceived by more moderate sectors of the Islamic world—those that
the Muslim theocrat consider to be “apostate”. Modification of the jihadist or theocrats’
views is nonsense; analyzing actions and policies to affect theocratic perceptions, it could
be argued, is a waste of time given that the Muslim theocrats belief that U.S. is an enemy
of Allah, and thus at war with the U.S. All the actions and policies of the U.S. will be
perceived as wrong or evil because the U.S. has rejected Allah, His Laws, His Prophet
and follow man’s laws.
This ideological war is a war for hearts and minds, but not as traditionally concep-
tualized. The challenge for the United States is to merely hold its ground in the eyes
of the moderate Muslim World and avoid any disastrous public relation nightmares. The
actual control of the relevant hearts and minds by the United States is something that
probably will not happen. As the Defense Department’s new counter-terror guidance
cogently notes: “Ultimately, however, winning the ideological war will depend on the
individual and collective ability of the Armed Forces to wage ‘culture-centric warfare’
in which understanding indigenous people and their culture is at least as important as
tactical military victories.”55
Cultural and Religious Intelligence and Sensitivity Becomes Critical
As suggested above, while winning the ideological war will be next to impossible by the
United States this does not mean that the U.S. can ignore cultural and religious issues.
Secretary Rumsfeld was recently quoted as stating: “Transforming is as much about
culture and people [as about programs].”56 It is critical that U.S. policies and actions are
developed and pursued with an understanding as to how such actions will be perceived
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by the Muslim World. The U.S. will never win over the jihadists but it must at least
hold its own relative the Muslim moderates and masses. And to accomplish this, the U.S.
must continually be aware of its moral standing. This is especially true now that the Arab
and Muslim press such as al Jazeera has expanded its coverage of regional and world
affairs. As the 9-11 Commission Report suggests, the U.S. GWOT policies “should be
accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military.
The strategy must clearly focus on the Arab and Muslim world, in all its variety.”57
This also implies that the United States must demonstrate moral leadership and
occupy the moral high ground, but this can be a daunting task during a war and post-9-11
world environment. Events such as U.S. prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib have damning
short- and long-term implications, and indeed represent a gift to the jihadists because
such events have the capacity to confirm their views of the moral bankruptcy of the
United States, motivate their supporters and influence fence sitters. Fighting terror with
terror is not only unproductive; it can also enhance the insurgent’s popular support.
The United States must sensitize its policy makers and war fighters to Muslim cultural
and religious matters. Such sensitivity to include appropriate language skills has the added
value of enhancing the development of actionable intelligence. Without such skills U.S.
troops will not be able to adequately interact with the population and indigenous troops.
As bluntly stated by U.S. Brigadier General Caret Ham, who commands the task force
for the Mosul area in northern Iraq, “We don’t lack for people to go thump in the night;
the challenge is getting the intel.”58 Cultural and religious knowledge has both strategic
and tactical significance.
The importance of understanding American culture, which they despise, is surely
not lost on the jihadists. While the U.S. needs to understand the Muslim cultures to
avoid making disastrous policy choices as well enhancing its possibility for collecting
actionable intelligence, the jihadists struggle to understand Western cultures because it
has important tactical implications. For example, the arrival of the jihadists from Hamburg
(Mohammed Atta, et. al.) was a godsend for al-Qaeda because of the group’s relative
familiarity with Western culture and their considerable English language skills.59 These
skills are much sought after by bin Laden and have been critical in the formulation of
jihadist attack cells and their strategies.
Sheer Numbers can be Daunting
With approximately 1.4 billion followers worldwide Islam is the second most popular
and fastest growing religion in the world. Muslims reside in every country of the world.
These demographics have important implications for the GWOT, especially in the context
of bin Laden wanting a clash of civilizations. In addition the jihadist ideology has proven
to be “a widely-appealing ideology that legitimizes the movement while it generates all
types of support and new recruits.”60
It is relatively clear that the majority of the world’s Muslims are not proponents or
supporters of bin Laden’s jihad. Nevertheless, the size of the Muslim world population
theoretically means that the jihadists have a vast reservoir of potential recruits. This po-
tential reservoir of recruits and supporters, as suggested above, are a major impetus for
al Qaeda actions. The JOC-DTO suggests that the “global insurgency” is already “sup-
ported by millions of sympathizers and enablers among the world’s Muslim population.”61
This presents a particular dilemma for the Untied States. The U.S. pursuit of the
GWOT can have the very real consequence of creating recruits for the jihadists. The
U.S. war and occupation of Iraq is a recent and instructive illustration of this dynamic.
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It has been argued by some that the war and occupation was a blessing for bin Laden
and has served as a recruiting poster for the jihadists.62 It has opened up a new front
for the jihad and has provided a new radicalizing and bonding experience for young
recruits.63 Recent estimates suggest that the Iraqi insurgency is comprised of more than
200,000 people, with an estimated 40,000 hard-guerillas engaged in operations against
U.S. forces.64 Iraq is proving to be valuable ground for the insurgents and jihadists to gain
valuable field experience and test new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Some
have gone as far as to argue that the U.S. failure to achieve a quick military and political
victory in Iraq, is giving the jihadists exactly the type of conflict—an insurgency—they
desired.65 We have seen a similar phenomenon in Afghanistan where there are troubling
reports that the Taliban are regrouping to challenge the perceived U.S. occupation and
President Karzai’s regime that is presumed to be an American puppet.
Muslim states generally have been very reluctant to join the American “coalition of
the willing” primarily because of the assumed domestic repercussions. Many of these
regimes have volatile internal problems that are difficult enough to control without open-
ing the door to the possible consequences resulting from explicitly supporting U.S. war
efforts. Explicit support of the GWOT is viewed as a harbinger for regime threatening
domestic instability. It is interesting to note that the combined gross domestic product of
the 22 countries in the Arab League is less than the GDP of Spain.66 Domestic problems
abound in this world and its leaders are constantly avoiding sparks that might ignite a
greater fire.
The insurgency in Iraq, of course, has demonstrated how difficult it can be for
moderate Muslim leaders to govern in the face of a determined jihadist opposition. From
October 1, 2004 to December 4, 2004, according to U.S. military figures, a total of 338
Iraqis working with the new Iraqi governing structures had been assassinated, including
35 police chiefs, mayors, and middle-ranking officials.67
The silence of support offered to the U.S. in their campaigns against the jihadists by
the moderate Muslim international community has been deafening. Few Muslim leaders
with the exception of Pakistan’s President Musharraf have had the gumption or commit-
ment to the GWOT to commit significant resources and explicit policies to support the
United States. And in the case of Musharraf, he only committed his support after being
given a series of nonnegotiable demands by the Bush Administration in the immediate
days after 9-11 and before the U.S. Afghanistan campaign commenced.68 Since lending his
support to the United States, Musharaff has been the target of two assassination attempts.
Ultimately, a key indicator of the eventual success of the GWOT is how U.S. policies
and actions are perceived by the moderate Muslim Community and how successful the
U.S. is at physically separating the jihadist organizations from the societies in which they
operate and from which they draw their resources.
How should one interpret the fact that over the last few years Osama has become one
of the most popular names for Arab Muslim male infants? Or consider recent opinion
polls of Arab Muslim populations as to their perspectives of the United States. American
engagement in much of the world is resented. For example, only 15% of the Egyptian
and 12% of the Saudi Arabian population has a favorable opinion of the United States.
In 2003 two-thirds of those polled in countries from Turkey to Indonesia were very or
somewhat fearful that the U.S. might eventually “attack them.”69
While it would be a fallacy to judge the naming of an infant or the results of an
opinion poll as definitive data as to the popularity of the jihadists or the negative image
of the United States, it does suggest that there are troubling undercurrents in the Arab
Muslim community.
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Recent Islamic history is not marked by an abundance of internationally popular and
revered figures. Michael Scheuer argues that while the average Muslim will not been
found in the streets protesting for Osama bin Laden, they still have incredible respect for
his veracity to challenge the position of the United States. Scheuer argues that bin Laden
may be the most respected, loved, charismatic figure of the last 150 years of Islamic
history.70 If this is indeed the case and more Muslims eventually embrace bin Laden’s
jihad or just silently support it, then the subsystem dominance of the international system
will intensify. As Benjamin and Simon suggest, “Islamists may not control parliaments
or government palaces, but they have occupied the popular imagination.”71
The United States Cannot Go it Alone
During the Cold War the United States built a great alliance to confront the Soviet Union
and its allies. The alliance was available to support the policies and campaigns of the
United States, because the U.S. was the international system’s dominant actor (defined
by the dominance of power), however the U.S. could have, at any time, acted alone to
counter Soviet actions if required by the circumstances. Today this is not the case.
Today’s international system is dominated and driven by less dominant actors—
the jihadist insurgents. While the United States claims and has demonstrated that it is
willing to confront the insurgents alone if necessary, this is not a recipe for success.
In a subsystem dominated international environment concerted effort by multiple actors
are required to change the system. Moreover, the U.S. insistence that “you are either
completely with us or against us” leaves little middle ground for policy debate and
positions amongst allies. U.S. policies and actions which ignored the concerns of its
traditional European allies eventually alienated them. It is a sad state of affairs for the
United States when fear of a protest by members of parliament negates an address by
President Bush or when he is met by widespread protests when he visits his northern
neighbor, Canada. Such a reaction to the President in the lands of two traditional U.S.
friends—one being America’s most prominent supporter in the GWOT—suggests a very
troubling environment for U.S. action and maneuver. Going it alone will not suffice.
The jihadists envision a conflict consisting of battles and isolated engagements spread
over time and space. While traditional campaigns against a much weaker foe would
usually allow the U.S. to go it alone, the nature of its enemy in the GWOT requires a
concerted effort by a broad coalition. As suggested by the 9-11 Commission Report, the
United States needs to take the lead role in a broad coalition to stop Islamic terrorists
and insurgents.72
Easy Solutions and Initial Impulses are Probably Wrong
During the Cold War the United States had a pronounced enemy that U.S. policy makers
came to know well. A large percentage of the U.S. national security infrastructure dur-
ing this period was devoted to exclusively analyzing every aspect of the USSR and its
intentions. The U.S. and the USSR, while extremely powerful, both had a lot to lose in
a superpower conflict. The potential for massive loses resulting from any head-to-head
conflict encouraged each to deter the other. In many respects an eerie tranquility was
realized as the two super powers maneuvered the international system. Communications
and interactions between the U.S. and USSR became routinized and this steady state de-
fined the international system equilibrium. While surprises and crises (i.e., disturbances
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to the routine or equilibrium) surely occurred during the Cold War period such events
were the exception rather than the rule of this system dominated system.
During the Cold War, decision makers had a clear range of alternative policies. The
nature of the Cold War made policy prescriptions and actions more obvious. This is surely
not the case in the present GWOT dominated international present system, where U.S.
policies cannot only alienate moderate Muslims but also traditional friends and allies.
Today’s system is characterized by threats that can emerge very quickly. These
threats are anything but routine. In addition, the jihadists have proven themselves to
be extremely clever. This, of course, was tragically witnessed on 9-11 when al Qaeda
employed airplanes as missiles, a threat NORAD had no protocols to address.73
The jihadist threat, unlike the Cold War Soviet threat, is also relatively vague. The
threat is not characterized by national boundaries nor can it be easily bargained or nego-
tiated with. Such a vague and amorphous threat can result in vague goals towards it. And
vague goals are often defined by initial impulses and easy solutions rather than policies
informed by thorough analysis. Moreover, such goals and respective policies aimed at
their realization are often misguided. For example, the notion that Iraqi democracy will
domino across the entire Middle East, or that the U.S. must differentiate between the
“Old Europe” and “New Europe,” or that Saddam Hussein was intimately involved in
9-11, or that there was an explicit link between Iraq and al Qaeda74 are all impulses
that might sound good and reinforce American desires, but ultimately represent simple
reductionist responses to complex problems.
Time Isn’t Necessarily on our Side
The patience of al Qaeda as well as other jihadists is possibly the most problematic di-
mension of the threat posed to the United States. The al Qaeda training manual states that:
[The member] should have plenty of patience for [enduring] afflictions if he
is overcome by the enemies. He should not abandon this great path and sell
himself and his religion to the enemies for his freedom. He should be patient
in performing the work, even if it lasts a long time.75
The GWOT unfortunately has the potential to last well beyond our children’s lifetime
and fought in a global arena that increasingly involves the U.S. homeland. The JOC-DTO
suggests that the GWOT will last “decades or generations.”76
Is the United States prepared for decades of violent warfare spread over the entire
globe and involving its homeland? Will the U.S. public draw war weary as the jihadists
continue their war of attrition?
A recent Washington Post–ABC News poll suggests that there is deep and growing
skepticism concerning the war in Iraq.77 This poll reveals a solid majority of U.S. citizens
believing that the war is a “mistake” and has led 56% of those polled to conclude that
the conflict given the associated human and financial costs is “not worth fighting.”78
Conclusions
The United States is only starting to recognize the true nature of the jihadist threat and its
wider implications for strategy and policy. The principal argument of this paper is that the
jihadist ideology as manifested by bin Laden really reflects the continuing and growing
salience of international subsystem dynamics—a system with characteristics that do not
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respect the primacy of U.S. power, position or national interests. Before addressing the
strategic challenge and taking steps to address the threat, the United States must come to
terms with the primacy of subsystem dynamics and intellectually divorce itself from the
ideas of bi-and uni-polarity that have been used as the basis to assert U.S. hegemony.
While roundly derided in the fields of international relations theory, Samuel Hunt-
ington’s Clash of Civilizations correctly identified the growing impact that subsystem dy-
namics would play in the international system. Bounding these dynamics with concepts
such as “culture” and “religion” left Huntington open to understandable attacks due to
the inherent difficulty of defining these concepts—not to mention the politically charged
nature of his argument. These issues miss the broader point of his argument, which we
believe has been borne out in events throughout the 1990s to today’s environment. Sub-
system dynamics, driven by a variety of different forces, are the defining feature of the
international environment.
A neo-realist view of the world asserting that the United States must assume the
mantle of sheriff or policeman in the absence of effective international institutions is
doomed to failure. Institutions designed around assumptions of hegemony and unipolarity
remain fundamentally mismatched to the broader environment. The temporal and spatial
nature of the global jihad makes it virtually impossible for the U.S. to tackle the enemy
alone. The U.S. does not have the forces, organization, equipment and it is doubtful that
the U.S. public has the will to commit the resources that would be necessary to conduct
a long and dispersed conflict. The limits of U.S. resources are vividly on display in Iraq.
Even when the jihad or insurgency is confined to a bounded space such as Iraq the
strains on U.S resources and strategy are obvious. While the attacks on the insurgent
stronghold in Fallujah appeared successful, the insurgents also seem to have successfully
dispersed, forcing U.S. forces into more reactive focused raids in a variety of other cities.
The response of the insurgents to the Fallujah attacks was to raise the level of violence,
which in turn has led to calls for more troops.79
The thinking expressed in SOCOM’s draft guidance seems in line with Rumsfeld’s
own intuitive thinking. Both actors seem to realize the incongruity between the threat
of the jihadists and DoD’s organizational structures. Both actors are on the right track
but face formidable obstacles in tackling the daunting organizational an operational chal-
lenges facing the Defense Department. The mature organizational structures within the
Defense Department remain locked in organizational behavior that is devoted to self-
preservation as a defining principle. These organizations rhetorically embrace the ideas
of change, but usually “wait out” the leadership calling for fundamental structural change.
The “values” of the system remain tied to platform driven planning and budgeting and
the endless bureaucratic battles for resources. But perhaps their most daunting challenge
remains the most intractable one: convincing the political leadership to embrace the need
to fundamentally reorient the nation’s organizational structures to meet the demands of
subsystem primacy. The stakes of the issue are enormous: if the U.S. fails to address the
intellectual and organizational challenges then they may win battles on the GWOT, but
will never win the wider war.
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